
















This	 paper	 uses	 examples	 from	 the	 history	 and	 practices	 of	 multi‐national	 and	 large	
companies	 in	 the	 oil,	 chemical	 and	 asbestos	 industries	 to	 examine	 their	 legal	 and	 illegal	
despoiling	 and	 destruction	 of	 the	 environment	 and	 impact	 on	 human	 and	 non‐human	 life.	
The	discussion	draws	on	the	literature	on	green	criminology	and	state‐corporate	crime	and	
considers	measures	 and	 arrangements	 that	might	mitigate	 or	 prevent	 such	damaging	 acts.	
This	paper	is	part	of	ongoing	work	on	green	criminology	and	crimes	of	the	economy.	It	places	
these	actions	and	crimes	in	the	context	of	a	global	neo‐liberal	economic	system	and	considers	










in	 the	 oil,	 chemical	 and	 asbestos	 industries	 to	 examine	 their	 legal	 and	 illegal	 despoiling	 and	
destruction	of	the	environment	and	impact	on	human	and	non‐human	life.	Despoilation	is	here	
defined	as	plundering	and	taking	what	is	valuable	and	/	or	depriving	others	of	what	is	valuable	













a	 global	 capitalist	 political	 economy	 are	members	 of	 the	 capitalist	 class,	 operating	within	 the	
institutional	 context	 of	 transnational	 corporations’.	 Power	 misused	 or	 used	 for	 profit	 to	 the	




respect,	 neo‐liberal	 doctrines	 contradict	 their	 very	 axioms:	 namely,	 that	 the	 full	 costs	 of	
transactions	must	be	borne	by	the	involved	parties.	Many	economic	activities	and	transactions,	
on	 the	 contrary,	 exact	 a	 significant	 price	 on	 humans	 and	 ecosystems,	 although	 conventional	
economists	 label	 such	 price	 with	 the	 reassuring	 euphemism	 ‘externalities’.	 In	 brief,	 neo‐




whereby	 only	 actions	 affecting	 other	 persons	 will	 give	 rise	 to	 legal	 rules	 (Ruggiero	 2013).	
‘Actions	which	 are	 clearly	 not	 of	 this	 kind	…	which	 clearly	 cannot	 affect	 or	 harm	others,	 can	
never	become	the	subject	of	rules	of	conduct’	(Hayek	1973:	101).	In	a	crucial	proviso,	however,	
it	is	stressed	that	‘some	harm	knowingly	caused	to	others	is	even	essential	for	the	preservation	
of	 spontaneous	order’;	 for	example,	 the	 law	cannot	prohibit	 ‘the	setting	up	of	a	new	business	
even	 if	 this	will	 lead	 to	 the	 failure	of	another’	 (Hayek	1973:	102).	Law	and	 legality,	 therefore,	
incorporate	 a	 range	 of	 conflicting	 expectations,	 some	 of	 which	 are	 bound	 to	 prevail,	 and	we	





as	 possible	 being	 fulfilled	 will	 be	 most	 enhanced	 if	 some	 expectations	 are	
systematically	disappointed.	This	means	also	that	it	is	not	possible	or	desirable	to	








to	 dispose	 and	 from	 the	 control	 of	 which	 all	 others	 are	 excluded’	 (Hayek	 1973:	 107).	 The	
distinction	Hayek	makes	between	meum	and	tuum	(‘mine’	and	‘thine’)	has	to	be	clearly	drawn:	
‘good	fences	make	good	neighbours’.	From	this	perspective,	by	drawing	boundaries,	the	aim	of	
the	 law	 is	 merely	 to	 prevent,	 as	 much	 as	 possible,	 the	 actions	 of	 different	 individuals	 from	
interfering	with	 each	 other.	 The	 law	 cannot	 be	 concerned	with	 the	 effects	 of	 such	 actions	 on	





exploiting	 it.	The	environment	 is	 therefore	both	meum	 (mine)	and	tuum	 (yours),	provided	we	
both	know	how	to	maximise	extraction	of	value	from	it.	Boundaries	are	not	determined	by	the	
identification	of	objects	over	which	different	 individuals	may	or	may	not	 exercise	 control	but	











on	 the	 crimes	 of	 the	 powerful	 is	 difficult	 without	 a	 willingness	 to	 expand	 one’s	 sample	 well	
beyond	 the	 legal	 definitions	 of	 crime.	 Two	 perspectives	 that	 draw	 upon	 this	 insight	 are	
considered	and	applied	here	–	state‐corporate	crime	analysis	and	green	criminology.	
	
Kramer	 et	 al.	 (2002;	 see	 also	Katz	 2010)	 define	 the	 state‐corporate	 crime	 approach	 as	 being	
concerned	with:		
	
…	 illegal	 or	 socially	 injurious	 actions	 that	 result	 from	 a	 mutually	 reinforcing	
interaction	between	(1)	policies	and/or	practices	in	pursuit	of	the	goals	of	one	or	
more	 institutions	 of	 political	 governance	 and	 (2)	 policies	 and/or	 practices	 in	




be	usefully	 applied	 to	 cases	 involving	 corporate	power	 and	environmental	 crime	 at	 local	 and	
global	levels	and	there	are	many	other	examples	of	environmental	harms	and	crimes	that	can	be	
seen	 as	 state‐corporate	 crimes	 (Kramer	 and	 Michalowski	 2012;	 Smandych	 and	 Kueneman	
2010).	 Examples	 include:	 corporate	 criminality	 and	 its	 impacts	 on	 the	 environment,	 such	 as	
pollution;	health	and	safety	 in	the	workplace	where	breaches	have	environmentally	damaging	




and	 impacts.	 ‘Green	 criminology’	 is	 an	 umbrella	 term	 to	 cover	 and	 capture	 the	 study	 of	
ecological,	 environmental	 or	 green	 crime	 or	 harm,	 and	 related	 matters	 of	 speciesism	 and	 of	
environmental	(in)justice	(South	et	al.	2013;	South	and	Brisman	2013;	White	in	press).	It	is	not	














The	 oil	 industry	 is	 involved	 in	 various	 forms	 of	 crime	 and	 harm	 and	 in	 varying	ways.	 Direct	
crimes	and	harms	of	pollution	may	be	seen	as	the	‘primary’	or	principal	offences	here.	However,	
as	noted	 elsewhere	 (South	 et	 al.	 2013:	 29‐30),	 it	 is	 also	 important	 to	 record	 the	 incidence	of	
‘secondary’	crimes	and	harms	in	which	the	existence	or	activity	of	an	operation	or	configuration	
of	 operations	 can	 be	 criminogenic,	 attracting	 and/or	 facilitating	 and/or	 causing	 other	 crimes	







are	 the	 ‘crime	 victims’	 and	 the	 illicit	 profits	 that	 result	 are	 used	 for	 financing	 other	 illegal	
activities.	 Official	 reports	 have	 drawn	 attention	 to,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 use	 of	 diverted	 oil	
profits	to	fund	campaigns	of	violence	–	including	terrorism	–	and,	on	the	other,	the	weakening	of	
already	 fragile	 states	 caused	 by	 crimes	 committed	 against	 the	 oil	 sector.	 McHugh	 (2012:	 2)	





Smuggling:	 While	 being	 an	 international	 industry,	 oil	 does	 not	 have	 standardised	 pricing.	 In	
some	countries	subsidies	and	tariffs	distort	the	market	and	can	result	in	higher	or	lower	costs.	
Because	 oil	 is	 obviously	 a	 valuable	 and	 transportable	 resource,	 this	 differential	 in	 pricing	 in	
different	markets	means	 that	 domestic	 and	 transnational	 illegal	markets	 are	 incentivised	and	
vulnerable	 elements	 of	 the	 population	 in	 oil	 wealthy	 states	 who	 do	 not	 benefit	 from	 energy	
revenues	may	 find	 smuggling	oil	 a	useful	 alternative	 source	of	 income.	This	 is	 a	 case	of	what	
Passas	(1999)	calls	‘criminogenic	asymmetry’.	
	
Mingling:	 This	 form	 of	 oil	 theft	 occurs	 through	 the	 mingling	 of	 officially‐sourced	 and	
unofficially‐sourced	 oil.	 In	 this	 case,	 criminal	 entrepreneurs	 are	 able	 to	 directly	 extract	 a	
quantity	 of	 crude	 oil	 beyond	 the	 amount	 officially	 licensed.	 However,	 sustained	 and	 sizeable	





however,	may	be	complex	and	risky	due	 to	surveillance	and	 the	equipment	required.	For	 this	




All	 three	 of	 these	 types	 of	 enterprising	 economic	 behaviour	 are	 particularly	 prominent	 in	
contexts	in	which	well‐structured	criminal	organisations	operate	and	where	illegal	enterprises	
are	meshed	with	violent	 insurgent	groups:	 in	 Iraq	and	Nigeria,	 for	 example.	 In	 such	contexts,	
political	 and	 economic	 purposes	 intertwine	 and	 conflict	 is	 exacerbated	 by	 hostile	 feelings	
aligned	against	foreign‐owned	companies	and	the	national	military	forces	that	are	securing	this	
extraction	 of	 wealth	 for	 the	 domestic	 elite	 and	 for	 the	 externalisation	 of	 profits	 to	 overseas	
companies.	 Transparency	 International’s	 ‘Corruption	 Perception	 Index’	 ranks	 oil‐producing	
states	in	the	Middle	East,	Africa	and	South	America	as	among	the	most	corrupt	in	the	world.		
	
There	 is,	 therefore,	 a	 close	 connection	 between	 crime	 –	 including	 violent	 crime	 –	 and	 oil,	 as	
exemplified	 in	 these	and	 the	 following	 cases.	 First,	 the	oil	 industry	generates	a	 ‘rentier	 effect’	
(the	literal	‘renting’	of	Indigenous	resources	to	external	parties),	producing	revenues	for	oil‐rich	
countries	but	in	contexts	where	elites	fail	to	equitably	distribute	the	incoming	wealth	among	the	
wider	population	 (Brisman	 and	 South	2013:	 60).	 Corruption	 is	widespread,	with	parts	 of	 the	














In	 order	 to	 allow	 foreign	 companies	 to	 extract	 oil	 in	 its	 territory,	 the	 Sudanese	 government	
expelled	the	Indigenous	population	from	their	lands,	which	resulted	in	violent	protest	by	locals	
who	depended	on	 the	 land	 for	 their	 livelihood.	The	 creation	of	 the	Sudan	People’s	Liberation	
Army	(established	in	1983)	was	the	ultimate	outcome	of	this	process	(Switzer	2002).	Similarly,	
in	Nigeria,	where	 in	 the	post	9/11	era	 the	US	has	 sought	 its	main	 source	of	oil	 supply,	 social	
tension	has	led	to	the	development	of	organised	violent	contest	and	conflict.	The	Ogoni	from	the	
Delta	region,	where	Nigeria’s	vast	oil	reserves	lie,	have	incurred	the	costs	of	oil	extraction	but	
have	been	excluded	 from	the	enjoyment	of	 the	wealth	generated.	 In	general	 terms,	 the	multi‐
billion‐dollar	oil	industry	of	Nigeria	has	not	produced	an	increase	in	per	capita	annual	income	in	













of	Mexico,	 spilling	almost	 five	million	barrels	of	oil	and	killing	11	workers.	Neither	 the	short‐
term	environmental	damage	nor	 long‐term	 impacts	of	 this	event	have	yet	been	 fully	assessed	
(Achenbach	 2011;	 Bergin	 2011;	 Schwartz	 2011).	 BP	 blamed	 Transocean,	 the	 company	 that	








into	 strategic	 business	 units,	 workers	 were	 fired,	 and	 managers	 were	 given	 short‐term	
contracts	with	renewal	linked	to	meeting	targets	based	on	high	volume	production	at	low	costs:		
	
Those	 who	 could	 extract	 the	 most	 oil	 while	 spending	 the	 least	 money	 were	
rewarded	 with	 promotions	 and	 bonuses.	 Promising	 junior	 executives	 were	
shuffled	between	posts	and	over	the	world,	rarely	staying	anywhere	long	enough	
to	 bother	 replacing	 outdated	 equipment	 or	 rusting	 pipelines.	 (Schwartz	 2011:	
25)		
	
Yet	Browne	covered	 this	operational	 ‘business	as	usual’	with	a	 claim	 to	be	 striving	 for	 a	new	
way	of	doing	things,	adopting	the	‘sunburst’	logo	and	new	aspirations	in	which	BP	was	said	to	
stand	 for	 ‘better	 people,	 better	 products,	 big	 picture,	 beyond	 petroleum’.	 Moving	 ‘Beyond	
Petroleum’	 was	 a	 claim	 to	 green	 credentials	 and	 a	 natural,	 clean	 image.	 This	 is,	 after	 all,	 a	
message	many	or	most	consumers	would	like	to	buy	into	–	we	can	have	what	we	want	to	fuel	
our	 consumer	 lifestyles	 because	 the	 necessary	 resources	 can	 be	 replaced,	 renewed	 or	 are	
limitless.		
	






done	 so	 yet	 and,	 until	 they	 do,	 they	 will	 manufacture	messages	 of	 denial	 about	 the	 ongoing	
harms	of	current	methods	of	extraction,	production	and	distribution.	Nor	is	this	to	say	that	the	
big	 corporations	 alone	 are	 solely	 responsible	 for	 damage	 done	 and	 demand	 that	 continues	




an	 interesting	 reflection	 of	 lack	 of	 such	 insight	 that,	 during	 the	 2010	 BP	 oil	 spill,	 a	 sign	was	
erected	in	a	village	in	southern	Louisiana	with	the	message	‘Damn	BP!	God	Bless	America!’.	To	
condemn	large	oil	companies	for	catastrophic	failings	is	understandable	but	such	events	should	
ideally	 lead	 to	 some	 reflection	 on	 the	 life‐style	 of	 those	 demanding	 greater	 efficiency	 and	
productivity	 from	 their	 operations.	 Within	 a	 year	 the	 US	 public	 was	 once	 again	 supporting	




Environmental	 harm	 is	 not,	 of	 course,	 exclusively	 associated	 with	 privately‐owned	 oil	


















And	 this,	 of	 course,	 relates	 to	 cases	 that	 are	 known	 and	 reported.	 There	 are	 spills,	 leaks	 and	






Many	 hazardous	 substances	 cause	 chemical	 injury	 and,	 with	 thousands	 of	 new	 chemicals	
introduced	each	year,	 it	 is	very	difficult	 to	estimate	 their	 long‐term	effects.	Chemicals	are	not	
typically	tested	 for	brain,	 immune	and	hormonal	effects,	and	often	not	tested	at	all	 for	cancer,	
neurodegenerative	 or	 autoimmune	 effects.	 Inadequate	 testing	 greatly	 limits	 knowledge	 for	
prevention	 of	 harm,	 choosing	 safer	 substances	 and	 technologies,	 and	 linking	 damage	 to	
exposure	 for	 affected	 persons,	 non‐human	 species	 and	 the	 wider	 environment	 (Lynch	 and	
Stretesky	2001).	
	
On	 a	 larger	 scale,	 research	 into	 chemical	 crimes	 is	 hampered	 by	 often‐successful	 attempts	 to	
depict	violations	of	laws,	regulations	or	just	good	practice,	as	‘accidents’,	‘oversights’,	‘failures	of	






The	 first	 such	 category	 is	 ‘resourcing’,	 which	 refers	 to	 a	 range	 of	 in‐built	 deficiencies	
characterising	 the	 chemicals	 industry	 as	 a	 whole:	 its	 personnel,	 hardware,	 production	
pressures,	planning,	communication,	training,	plant	design	and	maintenance.	All	of	these	causal	
factors,	 which	 are	 also	 termed	 first‐order	 causes,	 are	 underpinned	 by	 second‐order	 causes,	
among	which	Pearce	and	Tombs	include	and	critique	‘the	inherent	drive	towards	maximisation	
of	 profits	 in	 a	 capitalist	 system’,	 technological	 complexity,	 amoral	 calculation,	 and	 the	
inevitability	 of	 mistakes.	 To	 illuminate	 the	 nature	 of	 second‐order	 causes	 of	 accidents,	 they	
argue	 ‘for	 the	 need	 to	 combine	 understandings	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 social	 relations	 in	 chemicals	
plants	within	a	macro	political	economy’	(Pearce	and	Tombs	1998:	140).	They	stress	the	scope	
for	manipulation	 of	 communication	 and	 remark	 that	 ‘errors’	 are	 rooted	within	 the	 power	 of	



















Dow	Chemical,	 founded	 in	 1947	 and	merged	 in	 2001	with	 Union	 Carbide	 (as	 noted	 above,	 a	
company	not	without	 its	own	history	of	catastrophic	accident),	 is	a	global	operator	producing	
chemicals	 and	plastics	 for	 a	 variety	 of	 different	markets.	 Importantly,	 in	 terms	of	 how	 ‘state‐
























cover	 and	 fields	 in	 Vietnam,	 Laos	 and	 Cambodia	 as	 a	major	 tactic	 of	war	 between	 1961	 and	












For	 years,	 the	 US	military,	 citing	 research	 by	 Dow	 Chemical	 ...	 denied	 any	 link	




As	 one	 follow‐up	 action,	 from	 2012‐16,	 the	 US	 will	 spend	 $44	 million	 on	 cleaning	 up	 some	
(though	 not	 all)	 of	 the	 legacy	 of	 this	 state‐corporate	 crime,	 aiming	 to	 extract	 dioxin	 residues	
affecting	 the	 area	 where	 most	 barrels	 were	 stored	 at	 the	 former	 US	 airbase	 in	 Danang.	




















plants	 and	 into	 the	 surrounding	 environment,	 with	 fibres	 not	 only	 being	 inhaled	 but	 also	
settling	on	 land	and	water.	The	properties	 and	versatility	of	 asbestos	undoubtedly	explain	 its	
long	use	and	the	denial	of	problems	associated	with	both	its	production	and	its	instability	and	
deterioration	 in	 situ.	 But	 this	 denial	 has	 continued	 for	 over	 a	 hundred	 years,	 leaving	 a	 tragic	
history	 of	 chronically	 painful	 deaths	 and	 disease	 behind.	 The	 dangerousness	 of	 asbestos	was	















lawyers	 as	 well	 as	 pathologists	 could	 easily	 dismiss	 the	 association	 of	 asbestos	 with	 lethal	
respiratory	conditions.	
	
One	case	has	particular	relevance	because	of	 its	 international	 implications	and	because	 it	also	
marked	 the	 closing	 chapter	 of	 a	 100‐year	 history	 of	 industrial	 catastrophe.	 In	 June	 2013,	 the	
Appeal	Court	of	Turin	in	Italy	sentenced	Swiss	billionaire	Stephan	Schidheiny,	former	manager	




in	 1907	 at	 Casale	 Monferrato	 in	 Piemonte.	 Later,	 complexes	 were	 opened	 at	
Cavagnolo	in	Piemonte,	Rubiera	in	Emilia	Romagna,	and	Bagnoli	in	the	province	
of	 Naples.	 Although	 it	 has	 been	 known	 since	 1962	 that	 asbestos	 dust	 causes	
asbestosis	and	malignant	mesothelioma,	Eternit	only	closed	its	 last	 Italian	plant	
in	1986.	Throughout	the	plants’	production	life,	an	enormous	quantity	of	asbestos	
dust	 was	 dispersed	 into	 the	 atmosphere	 through	 factory	 chimneys	 that	 had	 no	


















The	 seriousness	 of	 the	 sentence	 was	 without	 precedent	 and	 can	 be	 seen	 to	 constitute	 the	
epilogue	 to	 a	 story	 spanning	 150	 years.	 However,	 the	 sentence	 also	 transcends	 the	 specific	
crime	 committed	 by	 Eternit,	 for	 it	 reinforces	 a	 principle	 of	 ‘precaution’.	 When	 faced	 with	
productive	 processes	 where	 the	 outcomes	 and	 consequence	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 severe,	 urgent	
measures	need	to	be	taken	even	when	available	evidence	is	not	overwhelming	and	even	if	this	






This	 complicates	 analysis	 of	 perpetrators.’	 As	 noted	 above,	 ordinary	 consumers	 are	 polluters	
and	 the	 drivers	 of	 demand	 for	 the	 ‘goods’	 that	 bring	 with	 them	 environmental	 ‘bads’.	 But	










behaviours	 and	 that	 impacts	 and	 other	 responses	 such	 as	 public	 ‘class	 actions’	 designed	 to	
provide	a	collective	means	to	obtain	remedy	from	the	company	can	be	powerful	alternatives.	Of	
course,	 as	 noted	 above	 in	 relation	 to	 large	 chemical	 companies	 like	Dow,	 the	 legal	 resources	





get	 publicity	 about	 the	 way	 in	 which	 modern	 business	 culture	 affects	 the	
environment,	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 legal	 and	 illegal	 operations.	 Part	 of	 the	
movement	functions	in	close	connection	with	the	companies	to	ensure	that	it	can	
have	 some	 influence	 on	 the	 companies’	 decisions.	 NGOs	 can	 inform	 companies	
about	 the	 norms	 and	 the	 responsibilities	 involved	 in	 environmental	 protection	
systems,	 and	 even	 about	ways	 to	 become	more	 environmentally	 sustainable	 in	





However,	 where	 such	 campaigning	 and	 informal	 and	 non‐statutory	 routes	 to	 mitigation	 and	
change	 fail,	 then	 there	 is	 a	 need	 for	 an	 effective	 legal	 platform.	 Relevant	 here	 would	 be	
proposals	 for	 the	extension	of	environmental	courts	currently	operating	 in	some	 jurisdictions	
and	the	establishment	of	an	International	Environmental	Court.	The	value	of	such	courts	lies	in	
the	focus	and	expertise	that	can	be	brought	to	bear	on	complex	and	technical	matters	that	are	
often	 unfamiliar	when	 introduced	 and	 processed	 through	 the	 traditional	 courts	 (Walters	 and	
Westerhuis	2013;	White	2013c).	Both	locally	and	internationally,	such	courts	could	draw	upon	
laws	 derived	 from	 international	 recognition	 of	 a	 crime	 of	 Ecocide	 (Higgins,	 Short	 and	 South	
2013).	 Such	 a	 law	 would	 be	 a	 powerful	 preventative	 force	 supporting	 the	 principle	 of	
precaution	noted	above.	By	 this	means,	 those	 in	 superior	or	 senior	positions	of	 responsibility	
would	 be	 at	 risk	 of	 prosecution	 if	 responsible	 for	 taking	 decisions	 that	 lead	 to,	 support	 or	





In	 his	 2012	 book,	 The	 Price	 of	 Inequality,	 Nobel	 Prize	 economist	 Joseph	 Stiglitz	 argues	 that	
because	of:	
	
…	 the	 oil	 and	 coal	 companies	 that	 use	 their	money	 to	 influence	 environmental	













money‐driven	political	system	to	grant	excessive	power	 to	 the	most	affluent.	 In	
short,	those	with	power	use	it	to	insulate	themselves	from	competitive	forces	by	
winning	 favorable	 tax	 treatment,	 government‐protected	 market	 share.	 (Edsel	
2012:	BR23)	
	
He	 argues	 there	 are	 other	 morally	 and	 economically	 un‐justifiable	 benefits	 that	 protect	 the	
powerful.	 Furthermore,	 the	 irresponsible	 and	 despoiling	 actions	 of	 the	 major	 corporations	
pursuing	 natural	 resource	 exploitation	 contribute	 to	 structural	 inequalities	 on	 the	 one	 hand	
and,	on	the	other,	to	the	distorting	dominance	of	the	GDP	model	of	‘growth	is	good	at	any	costs’.		
	
Gross	 Domestic	 Product	 is	 used	 in	 the	 forums	 of	 global	 economic	 power	 as	 the	 system	 of	
measurement	 of	 success	 but	 this	 is,	 as	many	 have	 pointed	 out,	 a	 rather	 flawed	measure.	 For	
example,	 critics	 of	 the	 permanent	 growth	 aspiration	 note	 that	 its	measurement	 tells	 us	 little	
about	negative	effects	such	as	distributional	and	social	justice.	Thus	countries	with	exceptional	
growth	 rates	may	 display	 exceptional	 levels	 of	 inequality	 and	 an	 average	 poor	 quality	 of	 life.	
GDP	 reflects	 the	 sum	of	 all	 the	 goods	 and	 services	produced	 inside	 a	 country,	 divided	by	 the	
number	of	people	 inhabiting	 it	 (Fioramonti	2013)	but	distorts	 the	actual	 success	of	 countries	
and	their	economic	systems,	not	only	because	it	fails	to	consider	variable	social	equality	but	also	
because	 it	 includes	 some	 service	 sectors	 which	 signal	 bad,	 rather	 than	 good,	 performance.	
Staggeringly	 obvious	 examples	 of	 these	 bad	 performers	 would	 be	 oil,	 chemical	 and	 mining	
companies	that	need	large	public	subsidies	to	produce	their	profits	and	that	leave	a	trail	of	eco‐
wreckage	 that	harms	public	health	and	eco‐system	vitality	 and	will	 require	yet	 further	public	









to	 the	 unintended	 creation	 of	 an	 economic	 Frankenstein.	 By	 the	 early	 1950s,	 GDP	 (earlier	
termed	 GNP)	 was	 accepted	 as	 the	 magic	 figure	 describing	 performance	 across	 the	 Western	
world	and	in	1953	‘the	UN	inaugurated	its	international	standards	for	national	accounts,	which	
were	 largely	 influenced	by	 the	methodology	developed	by	Kuznets	and	 the	US	Department	of	
Commerce’	 (Fioramonti	 2013:	 32).	 Imposed	 on	 developing	 countries,	 this	 measurement	 has	
implied	 that	 the	 road	 to	 a	 buoyant	 economy	 is	 built	 by	 selling	 resources	 in	 international	
markets	 and	 reducing	 domestic	 social	 expenditure.	 GDP	 does	 not	 take	 into	 account	 how	
developing	countries	are	largely	dependent	on	activity	in	the	informal	economy	sector.	Growth	
in	GDP	may	simply	reflect	deepening	social	inequality	as	the	affluent	increase	their	expenditure,	
the	 luxury	 goods	market	 thrives,	 and	 national	 resources	 that	 should	 be	 held	 in	 common	 are	















environment	 to	 be	 priced,	 and	 they	 don’t	 want	 our	 GDP	 metrics	 to	 be	 adjusted	 to	 reflect	
sustainability’.		
	
Including	 costs	 to	 the	 environment	 as	 a	 negative	 item	 within	 the	 GDP	 would	 imply	 that	
industries	should	be	charged	for	the	damage	caused.	As	they	are	not	charged,	they	are	indirectly	
receiving	hidden	subsidies	which	add	to	other	gifts	such	as	favourable	tax	treatment	and	access	




Because	 of	 the	 oil	 and	 coal	 companies	 that	 use	 their	 money	 to	 influence	
environmental	regulation,	we	live	in	a	world	with	more	air	and	water	pollution,	
in	an	environment	 that	 is	 less	attractive	and	 less	healthy	than	would	otherwise	
be	the	case.	(Stiglitz	2012:	99)		
	
Environmental	 regulations	are	not	 the	only	 target	of	polluting	 industrial	parties,	 as	 funds	are	
also	 generously	 distributed	 among	 groups	 that	 ‘scientifically’	 cast	 doubt	 on	 climate	 change	
(Goldenberg	2013).		
	
Neo‐liberal	 antagonism	 toward	 economic	 regulations	 argues	 these	 are	 costly	 and	will	 reduce	
growth.	 In	 this	 view,	 ‘regulation’	 is	 what	 Taylor	 (1997)	 called	 a	 ‘condensed	 metaphor’	
representing	 a	 broader	 (and	 unwelcome)	 critique.	 And	 indeed,	 an	 alternative	 critical	 view	
argues	 that	 economic	 development	 that	 causes	 environmental	 degradation	makes	 a	 negative	










of	 social	 solidarity	 leaves	 a	 gaping	 hole	 in	 the	 social	 order.	 It	 then	 becomes	
peculiarly	 difficult	 to	 combat	 anomie	 and	 control	 the	 resultant	 anti‐social	
behaviours	such	as	criminality.	(Harvey	2011:	80)	
	
In	 turn	 this	 social	 incoherence	 extends	 to	 a	 loss	 of	 proper	 social	 thinking	 about	 anti‐





global	 conundrum	 for	 the	 future	 is	 how	 to	 address	 energy	 deficits	 and	 balance	 this	 with	
addressing	 the	 problem	 of	 sustainability.	 A	 related	 problem	 faces	 us	 as	 we	 become	 a	 ‘waste	
society’:	how	to	cope	with	the	unwanted	discards	of	consumer	society	and	mounting	waste	as	
the	west	continues	to	consume	at	a	ferocious	rate	and	developing	nations	are	rapidly	generating	
their	 own	 markets	 and	 demand?	 In	 the	 midst	 of	 a	 global	 economic	 downturn,	 remedies	 for	
prevailing	economic	insecurity	and	depression	are	viewed	almost	entirely	in	terms	of	pushing	
the	 production	 lines	 back	 to	 full	 power	 and	 increasing	 the	 rate	 of	 consumption	 by	 applying	
‘human	genius’	to	enterprise	and	exploitation.	There	is	an	interesting	criminological	crossroads	







included	oil,	 chemical	 and	processing	 industries	but	others	might	 include	 the	development	of	
carbon	 trading	 markets	 and	 their	 misuse	 and,	 as	 one	 prime	 current	 example,	 widespread	
related	fraud	(Walters	and	Martin	2012).	Perhaps	what	is	needed	for	the	future	is	less	of	a	rapid	
return	 to	 ‘business	 as	 usual’	 and	 a	 new	 turn	 toward	 ethical	 practice,	 green	 economics	 and	
modes	of	production	and	consumption	based	on	principles	of	environmental	sustainability.	
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